Biden鈥檚 Ukraine Visit Had Symbolic, Practical Value, Duke Expert Says
On President Biden鈥檚 Visit to Ukraine This Week
鈥淧resident Biden鈥檚 visit to Kyiv was enormously significant. It was significant on a strictly symbolic basis. In international politics, symbols matter. The president of the United States arrived in what is certainly, rightly considered a war zone 鈥 and not a war zone in which American troops are fighting like Afghanistan or Iraq 鈥 where many presidents before President Biden have made trips. It was a real boost 鈥 I鈥檓 hearing this from friends and colleagues in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine 鈥 to Ukrainian morale. A really public demonstration that the United States stands with them.鈥
鈥淚t was also a pretty clear act of defiance against Vladimir Putin, who has driven his country into further and further depths of pariah status. To show the United States and Joe Biden himself is uncowed by Russia鈥檚 current war in Ukraine 鈥 that the president won鈥檛 let Vladimir Putin dictate where he does and doesn鈥檛 go and what he will and will not make a foreign policy priority.鈥
鈥淛oe Biden did not come to Ukraine empty-handed. He came with some half a billion dollars worth of further aid budgets, including some very sophisticated technical weaponry. But as much as people get really excited talking about sophisticated tanks and things like that, he also pledged more artillery rounds and barrels, replacement barrels, that are really the background of what is enabling the Ukrainian military right now to fend off the Russian invasion.鈥
On the importance of the aid package
鈥淣one of that is symbolic. This is not the early days when there were, frankly, pretty risible statements like the to the Ukrainian war effort. This is lethal munitions and the critical supplies to back them. And that鈥檚 what Ukraine needs to stay in this fight and ultimately drive the Russian invasion off Ukrainian territory. These are long-range missiles. These are infantry fighting vehicles. These are artillery shells. This is very much exactly what Ukraine needs.鈥
鈥淚t's not everything that could be done, especially in terms of long-range precision strike weapons, which would be a huge boon to the Ukrainian war effort 鈥 but it is an important and not just symbolic contribution.鈥
On Vladimir Putin鈥檚 recent comments on the war
鈥淰ladimir Putin returned to playing his old, worn-out record. A little bit of talking about the war, and then very quickly descending into bizarre conspiracy theories about the atheistic depravity of the west and all sorts of bizarre, culture-war trojan horses. When I listened to Vladimir Putin鈥檚 speech earlier today, a huge proportion of it kind of could have been from any speech that he gives. Including, frankly, in 2023, bizarre shout-outs to the grain harvest, which is a metric that no other advanced nation in the world makes a big point of in public policy addresses. He made certain comments about the war effort, trying to inflate this into an existential struggle for Russia, trying to make claims with really no evidence whatsoever, because there is none, about Russia being forced to invade its neighbor to preempt something worse. What that worse thing is, is something Vladimir Putin has always been pretty vague about because there鈥檚 no there, there.鈥
鈥淲hen Vladimir Putin took to the podium today, all you had to do 鈥 was to look at his audience, which was all of the key players in his inner circle, his cabinet, key figures in Russian politics. And just how extraordinarily unenthusiastic every single person in that room looked.鈥
On whether Putin鈥檚 domestic support is wavering
鈥淚n his speech today, Putin claimed the country is 100 percent behind the war effort and it has risen up in a quasi-religious patriotism to take the fight to the Ukrainian menace 鈥 whatever that means. This is patently not the case. Russia is an extraordinarily oppressive state, in which any show of dissent or disagreement with the government, especially on the issue of the war in Ukraine 鈥 is extraordinarily dangerous.鈥
鈥淏ut all you have to do is look at the rise in ticket prices out of Russia, the quantity of Russian citizens who have decamped to places like Serbia, United Arab Emirates and elsewhere, to get a pretty clear picture of that, especially among more educated, more upwardly mobile figures in Russian society who have options, they are voting with their feet. They are leaving Russia to try to make their fortunes wherever they can in order to avoid either being conscripted into the war effort or simply seeing their lies and quality of life dragged down.鈥
On What Russia will Say on First Anniversary of War, Friday, February 24
鈥淚t鈥檚 possible that by Friday the Russians will be in a position militarily, for example, to claim that they have taken 鈥 or I鈥檓 sure they鈥檒l say something absurd like 鈥榣iberated鈥 鈥 a place like Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. Bakhmut is not really much of a prize.
The battlefield right now is pretty fluid. Advances 鈥 are causing huge losses. A success in a place like Bakhmut is a totally pyrrhic victory. The quantity of forces and expendables like artillery that has poured into Bakhmut in order to obtain a strategically not all-that valuable objective are far outweighed.鈥
On Russia鈥檚 Invasion Interests Outside Ukraine
鈥淲e鈥檝e seen such huge, systemic rot uncovered in the Russian military and also in the Russian political system such that I think that when someone like Ramzam Kadyrov, who is the murderous dictator of the Russian region of Chechnya, talks about Poland being next, I think most serious people simply roll their eyes.鈥
Simon Miles
Assistant Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy
On How This Conflict Ends
鈥淚 think the situation right now is extremely fluid. The Russians would have been much better served to wait out a Ukrainian offensive as opposed to launching their own. Hoping, and this is not a pipe dream, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would sense that, in order to keep the flow of foreign aid going, he needed to show that he could do something with it. He would be the first mover and the Russians could then counter-attack against a tired Ukrainian force. In actual fact, the opposite is going to happen. I think the current Russian offensive is quite underwhelming.鈥
鈥淎t this juncture, the Russian military has no hope of another push on Kyiv or anything along those lines. Holding onto territory in the east and to a lesser degree, the south, is the pretty paltry best they can hope to do. The Ukrainian population and certainly political and military leadership have shown no predisposition toward any kind of negotiated settlement which cedes any of Ukraine鈥檚 borders.鈥
鈥淎t this point, I think it鈥檚 certainly premature for American or other policymakers to try to goad them into taking that approach. That being said, we know wars tend to end in negotiations. Terminating a war is rarely a clean, precise undertaking. So certainly, it鈥檚 wise to start thinking of that next phase, albeit in a position where the Ukrainians clearly have military superiority and the Russians continue to be on the back foot.鈥